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ABSTRACT
What does science tell us about memory phenomena such as false and repressed memories? This
issue is highly pressing as incorrect knowledge about these memory phenomena might
contribute to egregious effects in the courtroom such as false accusations of abuse. In the current
article, we provide a succinct review of the scientific nature of false and repressed memories. We
demonstrate that research has shown that about 30% of tested subjects formed false memories
of autobiographical experiences. Furthermore, this empirical work has also revealed that such
false memories can even be implanted for negative events and events that allegedly occurred
repeatedly. Concerning the controversial topic of repressed memories, we show that plausible
alternative explanations exist for why people claim to have forgotten traumatic experiences;
explanations that do not require special memory mechanisms such as the unconscious blockage
of traumatic memories. Finally, we demonstrate that people continue to believe that unconscious
repression of traumatic incidents can exist. Disseminating scientifically articulated knowledge on
the functioning of memory to contexts such as the courtroom is necessary as to prevent the
occurrence of false accusations andmiscarriages of justice.
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The scientific nature of false and repressed
memories
The issue of how traumatic experiences are remembered is
oneof themostcontestedareas inpsychology.Anespecially
controversial aspect of this is the topic of repressed mem-
ories. Repressed memory is the idea that traumatic experi-
ences – such as sexual abuse – can be unconsciously
blocked for many years such that the individual does not
know they were abused, and later recovered in pristine
form. The issue of repressed memories has become
especially pervasive during the so-called “memory wars”;
theongoingdebatebetweenthose (oftenmemoryscholars)
asserting that there is no credible scientific evidence that
repressedmemoriesexistandothers (oftenclinicians)claim-
ing that repressed memories do exist. Many scholars have
assumed that this debate has been settled, but there is evi-
dence that this debate is far from over (Otgaar et al., 2019).
An important element of the debate concerned situations




repressed and that therapy helped recover those memories.
However, memory researchers contended that such thera-
peutic interventions might be inherently suggestive and
lead to the creation of false memories of abuse (e.g., Loftus,
1993). Furthermore, another argument was that claims of
repressedmemoriescouldoftenbeexplainedbyordinary for-
getting (Clancy&McNally, 2005). That is, it is quitenormal that
people who have experienced a traumatic event will not
remember all details of that experience.
Considerable scientific work has been devoted to
understanding how false memories are formed and
whether repressed memories exist. However, questions
have been raised about the ecological validity of false
memory research (Blizard & Shaw, 2019). Furthermore,
although controversial, the topic of repressed memory con-
tinues to be very alive in academic, clinical, and legal circles
(for a review, see Otgaar et al., 2019). In the current article,
our intention is to set the records straight and provide a
brief review of what science tells us about the phenomenon
of false and repressed memories. To accomplish this, we will
pose several target questions about these phenomena that
have frequently been discussed in the literature.
The science behind false memories
We will start with several key points that have frequently
been mentioned in the false memory literature. Specifi-
cally, we will discuss several issues such as the prevalence
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of false memory susceptibility and the ecological validity
of false memory implantation experiments.
How susceptible are people to forming false
memories?
A pertinent issue in false memory studies is individuals’
susceptibility to creating false memories. Importantly,
not one answer can be given to this question as
different false memory methods have been constructed
over the past several decades. For example, false
memory production can result from associative processes
within the mind (e.g., Deese/Roediger–McDermott false
memory task; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995)
or from external suggestions from others (e.g., misinforma-
tion paradigm; false memory implantation; Loftus, 2005).
For the current article, we will mainly focus on false mem-
ories elicited due to suggestions and misinformation
because these are often most relevant to the memory
wars debate.
One relevant false memory paradigm is the false
memory implantation method (e.g., Loftus & Pickrell,
1995). In this method, participants are told to elaborate
on events that are suggested to have truly happened to
them, where several of the events actually did happen to
them, but one event that did not. Using this procedure,
researchers have implanted a wide variety of false
events, ranging from being lost in shopping mall (Loftus
& Pickrell, 1995), to taking a hot air balloon ride (Otgaar
et al., 2013; Wade et al., 2002), to being abducted by a
UFO (Otgaar et al., 2009), to bumping into a punch bowl
at a wedding (Hyman & Billings, 1998). In general, these
studies have shown that such suggestions can lead to
false autobiographical memories.
When examining the rates at which participants fall
prey to these suggestions, studies have found different
percentages ranging between 0% (Pezdek et al., 1997)
to 70% (Shaw & Porter, 2015; but see also Wade et al.,
2018, who found only 30% with different criteria).
Wade and colleagues (2002) were one of the first to
find that across false memory implantation experiments,
the weighted mean percent of false memories was 30%.
In a more recent review, Brewin and Andrews (2017)
analysed many false memory implantation studies and
found full-blown false memories in only 15% of partici-
pants. Brewin and Andrews argued that implanting
autobiographical false memories is not easy nor
common.
An important limitation of Brewin and Andrew’s review
was that they collapsed all false memory implantation
studies and based on this, calculated a mean percent.
False memory implantation studies have used various
scoring methods to measure false memory formation
and therefore calculating mean percentages is not the
most precise estimate of false memory susceptibility.
Therefore, Scoboria and colleagues (2017) applied a new
coding system to eight previous false memory
implantation studies. They found that overall 30.4% of
reports were classified as false memories and this percen-
tage increased to 46.1% when the suggestion included
self-relevant information, imagination procedures, and
was not accompanied by a photo.
Collectively, what research on false memory implan-
tation has shown is that a non-trivial percentage of partici-
pants (around 30%) can be swayed into remembering a
false autobiographical event. So, in contrast to what is
sometimes argued (Brewin & Andrews, 2017), false
memory implantation can quite commonly occur when
the right conditions are met such as probing guided
imagery (see also Nash et al., 2017; Otgaar et al., 2017).
Real world therapy scenarios that repeat suggestions
over time may yield even higher percentages than exper-
iments that often involve just one or two suggestions.
How ecological valid are false memory
implantation studies?
There have been numerous articles in which researchers
have debated the ecological validity of false memory
experiments (e.g., Ceci et al., 1998; Pezdek & Lam, 2007;
Wade et al., 2007). Here we use the classic definition pro-
vided by Bronfenbrenner (1977) who stated that “ecologi-
cal validity refers to the extent to which the environment
experienced by the subjects in a scientific investigation
has the properties it is supposed or assumed to have by
the investigator” (p. 516).
One aim of false memory implantation work is to say
something about false memories of traumatic events
(e.g., sexual abuse). An important property of false mem-
ories of sexual abuse is that these memories often
concern emotionally negative events and that such mem-
ories sometimes concern repeated events of abuse. Scho-
lars have argued that false memory implantation studies
do not meet these criteria. For example, Blizard and
Shaw (2019) postulated that false memory researchers
have “not been able to implant memories for repeated
events, as is often the case with reported childhood
sexual abuse” (p. 15). Similarly, Brewin and Andrews
(2017) argued that “a challenge for the future will be to
demonstrate that it is possible to implant memories of a
repeated event” (p. 20).
Concerning the implantation of negative events,
research has shown that it is possible to elicit false mem-
ories for negative events. For example, Porter and col-
leagues (1999) succeeded in making people falsely
report remembering being bitten by a vicious dog. Also,
Shaw and Porter (2015) falsely suggested to participants
that they committed a crime (e.g., theft) which led to
some apparent false memories. Furthermore, Otgaar
et al. (2008) showed that in children, a negative false
event (i.e., being accused of copying) was more easily
implanted than a neutral false event (i.e., moving to
another classroom), a pattern that has been also detected
in other false memory paradigms as well (e.g., Bookbinder
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& Brainerd, 2016). Apart from these examples, researchers
have implanted various other negative events in children
and adults such as receiving a rectal enema (Otgaar
et al., 2010; Pezdek et al., 1999), a finger getting stuck in
a mousetrap (Ceci et al., 1994), and being hospitalised
(Hyman et al., 1995). Of course, because of obvious
ethical reasons, it is not possible to implant events that
are even more stressful and negative. However, negative
events that have been implanted share certain similarities
with sexual abuse such as that the events can be painful
(e.g., rectal enema, mousetrap), shameful (e.g., rectal
enema), and emotionally arousing (e.g., hospitalisation).
The issue of whether repeated events can be implanted
in memory has recently been addressed by Calado and col-
leagues (2020). In their experiment, they falsely told adult
participants that they lost their cuddling toy several times
while control participants were told that they only lost it
once. Strikingly, they found that repeated false events
were as easily inserted in memory as suggesting that the
event happened once. So, this study not only showed
that repeated events can be implanted, it raised doubts
about the idea that repeated events might be harder to
implant than single events.
Taken together, although the negative false events
used in false memory implantation are still a far stretch
from traumatic events that matter in legal cases (such as
sexual abuse), an accumulating body of research has
shown that the negative events in research do share
some properties with the real life events in question.
Science and repressed memories
Wewill discuss two issues of relevance for the debate on the
existence of repressed memories. That is, we will describe
research on the evidence, or lack of, for repressed memories
and the belief in unconscious repressed memories.
What does science say about the existence of
repressed memories?
Influenced by psychoanalytic and hypnotic scholars such
as Sigmund Freud and Jean-Martin Charcot, the core prop-
osition behind repressed memories is that they act as a
defence mechanism when people experience a traumatic
event. Here, the idea is that when traumatic experiences
are devastating, the mind automatically and unconsciously
banishes this experience from conscious awareness. The
purported consequence is that people can no longer recol-
lect the experience that triggered it, and are often unaware
that they have been abused or traumatised (Loftus, 1993;
McNally, 2005; Piper et al., 2008). The unconscious
repressed memory is thought to continuously exert a
mental and physical toll, through symptoms, and the
chief way to reduce this is by recovering the traumatic
content (van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995).
Several plausible alternative explanations have been
put forward to explain the apparent forgetting of
traumatic incidents (see e.g., McNally, 2005). For
example, people who are victimised do not want to talk
about or may even forget the traumatic experience, but
that does not equate with the unconscious repression of
trauma. Second, a well-known phenomenon called the
forget-it-all-along effect might explain people’s claims
that they have forgotten their traumatic experiences
(Arnold & Lindsay, 2002; Schooler et al., 1997). Specifically,
according to this phenomenon, some people who claim to
have forgotten sexual abuse all-along may not have as
further investigation can reveal that they actually disclosed
their memory to others, but have forgotten this disclosure.
Third, people might not have experienced the event in
question as traumatic at the time it happened and later
reinterpreted the event as being abusive in retrospect
(McNally & Geraerts, 2009). Finally, a voluminous body of
research has shown that contrary to the idea underlying
the concept of repressed memories, traumatic experiences
are in general well remembered (Goodman-Brown et al.,
2003; McKinnon et al., 2015; McNally, 2005; Merckelbach
et al., 2003; Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1990).
Some authors have argued that although unconscious
repression of autobiographical memories is unlikely, a con-
scious type of repression might be a plausible alternative
to explain the forgetting of traumatic experiences (Ander-
son & Green, 2001; Anderson & Hulbert, 2020). Oftentimes,
instead of the term repression, the term suppression or
motivated forgetting is used in this regard (Anderson &
Hanslmayr, 2014). Indeed, studies have shown that when
participants are instructed to forget or not think of items
on a memory test, subsequent memory retrieval of that
information is less accurate (Anderson & Hulbert, 2020;
Sahakyan et al., 2013). However, a significant limitation
with this work is that most of it has focused exclusively
on simple stimuli such as words or pictures and there
have been failures to replicate these suppression-
induced forgetting experiments (e.g., Bulevich et al.,
2006; Wessel et al., 2020). Compared with studies on
implanted false memories, the ecological validity of work
on suppression is lacking.
So, the idea of unconscious repressed memories runs
counter to research on how traumatic experiences are
stored and retrieved in memory (Engelhard et al., 2019).
Plausible alternative explanations exist for why people
sometimes claim not to remember traumatic experiences
(e.g., reinterpreting memories) and these explanations
need to be discussed in the debate on whether repressed
memories exist.
Do people believe in the existence of unconscious
repressed memories?
A major question in the debate on the existence of
repressed memories is whether people actually believe
in the concept of repressed memories. To examine this,
researchers have asked participants about their beliefs
about repressed memories. For example, Merckelbach
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andWessel (1998) found that 94% (n = 47) of students indi-
cated some believe in repressed memories. Magnussen
and colleagues (2006) surveyed 2000 Norwegian people
from the general population and found that 45% (n =
900) endorsed the view that traumatic memories can
repressed. Even more recent studies have detected such
high endorsement rates. For example, Patihis and col-
leagues (2014) showed that 81% (n = 316) of a U.S.
student sample believed that traumatic memories are
often repressed.
However, it was not clear whether the surveyed people
were expressing a belief in conscious repression (suppres-
sion) or themore controversial idea ofunconscious repressed
memories (Brewin et al., 2020). Nevertheless, recent survey
work found that many people and professionals do indeed
endorse the concept of unconscious repression.
For example, Houben and colleagues (2020) surveyed eye
movement desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR) thera-
pists as to whether “the mind is capable of unconsciously
blocking out memories of traumatic events.” In two
studies, Houben and colleagues showed that large percen-
tages of small samples of EMDR therapists agreed with this
statement (Study 1: 91.6%, n = 11; Study 2: 70.7%, n = 29).
Furthermore, in a recent study, we specifically asked
student participants whether they believed in unconscious
repression and found high endorsement rates [Study 1 (N
= 230): 59.2% (n = 45); Study 2 (N = 79): 67.1% (n = 53)];
Otgaar et al., 2020). Furthermore, in an extended replica-
tion of our work (Dodier et al., in press), participants
were also asked about their belief in unconscious repres-
sion. The authors also found that many people endorsed
the belief in unconscious repression, even more so than
for deliberate (conscious) suppression (see Dodier et al.,
in press). Finally, in another study, we specifically asked
what people mean when they believe that traumatic mem-
ories can be repressed (Otgaar, Wang, Dodier, et al., 2020).
We showed that 80.9% (n = 735) did indeed mean that
such repressed memories are unconscious.
In short, the belief in unconscious repressed memories
remains well entrenched in the general population and in
some clinical contexts. This belief has been and can be
hazardous as it might guide therapists to suggestively
dig for hidden memories of abuse in their patients.
Concluding remarks
In the current article, we have provided a brief overview of
the scientific status of false and repressed memories.
Research has clearly shown that false memories can
be implanted for autobiographical experiences even
when these experiences are emotionally negative and
concern repeated events (e.g., Calado et al., 2020; Porter
et al., 1999). In contrast, scientific evidence on the exist-
ence of unconscious repressed memories is lacking and
even empirical work on suppression is deficient, and not
ecologically matched to entire autobiographical
experiences.
The current overview is timely as there are critiques on
the scientific work on false memories and unsupported
claims concerning the topic of repressed memories (e.g.,
Brewin et al., 2020). This might be perilous as there are
strong indications that the “memory wars” are far from
settled, and that this extends to practice (Patihis & Pender-
grast, 2019). We will give two concrete examples. First, the
term dissociative amnesia has been referred to as an
inability to recall autobiographical memories, ones that
mostly originate from stressful or traumatic experiences.
This term is currently deeply embedded in the DSM-5
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and heavily used
in psychological and psychiatric quarters (see Otgaar
et al., 2019). However, dissociative amnesia shares many
similarities with the controversial topic of repressed
memory, but likely because of its inclusion in the DSM-5,
has not received as much critical scrutiny. Second, in
several European countries (e.g., Belgium, France), statutes
of limitations to prosecute sexual crimes have been abol-
ished or extended based on the idea that traumatic mem-
ories can be blocked for many years (e.g., Dodier & Tomas,
2019). A negative, but unforeseen, consequence of this
abolishment is that falsely recovered memories of abuse
allegedly taking place decades ago might find their way
in court – potentially leading to false accusations and
wrongful convictions.
To conclude, the debate on how traumatic experiences
affect memory rages on today and memory scholars
should be cognizant of the fact that the controversial
issues such as repressed memory (whether conscious or
unconscious) oftentimes impact other settings outside of
academia such as therapeutic settings and the legal
arena. Memory scholars have a responsibility to be aware
of these sensitivities and when needed, educate interested
parties such as the public and legal system about these
controversies. By doing so, there is a chance that fewer
false memories of abuse will arise in clients, and prevent
false accusations sticking in court.
Features of memory
. On average, about 30% of participants form false mem-
ories in implantation studies
. Implanted false memories can occur for negative events
and for events that allegedly occurred repeatedly
. Plausible alternative explanations exist in place of
unconscious repressed memories such as ordinary for-
getting and reinterpreting memories
. Many people continue to believe in the controversial
idea of unconscious repressed memories
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